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Abstract— Key management is a core mechanism to ensure
the security of applications and network services in wireless
sensor networks. It includes two aspects: key distribution and
key revocation. Many key management protocols have been
specifically designed for wireless sensor networks. However, most
of the key management protocols focus on the establishment of
the required keys or the removal of the compromised keys. The
design of these key management protocols does not consider the
support of higher level security applications. When the applications are integrated later in sensor networks, new mechanisms
must be designed. In this paper, we propose a security framework,
uKeying, for wireless sensor networks. This framework can be
easily extended to support many security applications. It includes
three components: a security mechanism to provide secrecy for
communications in sensor networks, an efficient session key
distribution scheme, and a centralized key revocation scheme.
The proposed framework does not depend on a specific key
distribution scheme and can be used to support many security
applications, such as secure group communications. Our analysis
shows that the framework is secure, efficient, and extensible.
The simulation and results also reveal for the first time that
a centralized key revocation scheme can also attain a high
efficiency.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are promising solutions
for many applications and security is an essential requirement of WSNs. Among all security issues in WSNs, key
management is a core mechanism to ensure the security of
applications and network services in WSNs [1]. It includes
two aspects: key distribution and key revocation. The goal of
the key distribution is to establish the required keys between
sensor nodes which must exchange data. Key revocation is
used to remove compromised sensor nodes from the network.
Many key management protocols have been specifically
designed for wireless sensor networks. However, most of the
key management protocols focus on the establishment of the
required keys or the removal of the compromised keys. The
design of these schemes does not consider the support of
higher level security applications. When these applications are
later integrated in sensor networks, new mechanisms must be
designed. For example, secure group communication (SGC) is
an important application and it is also very useful in wireless
sensor networks [2]. Although the secure group communication problem has been extensively studied in the context
of secure multicast in wired networks, most of them are not
suitable for WSNs due to the constraints on the sensor nodes.
A few papers [3], [4] address the secure group communication

problem in the context of sensor networks. In these papers,
new group rekeying schemes are designed in addition to
the key management protocols in the sensor networks. In
the literature there is a lack of a security framework which
provides an integrated solution for key management and higher
level security applications for sensor networks.
In this paper, we propose a security framework, uKeying, for
wireless sensor networks. The proposed framework includes
three components: a security mechanisms to provide confidentiality, authentication, and integrity for the communication,
an efficient session key distribution scheme, and a centralized
key revocation scheme. The security of the communication is
ensured by two types of keys: encryption key, and message
authentication code (MAC) key. Both of the two keys are
bound to a globally distributed session key. The session key
can be distributed in the network using a broadcasting message
in one round. The proposed framework does not depend
on a specific key distribution scheme and can be used to
support many secure applications, for example, secure group
communication (SGC), in wireless sensor networks.
Our contributions in this paper include the following:
1) We propose a security framework which can be easily
extended to support higher level security applications in
wireless sensor networks.
2) We show for the first time that centralized key revocation
scheme can also attain a high efficiency in wireless
sensor networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II discusses the related work. Section III introduces our
proposed key management framework. The security and performance analyses are presented in Section IV, and followed
by the simulation experiments and results in Section V. Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. R ELATED WORK
As discussed earlier, key management includes two aspects:
key distribution and key revocation. Many key distribution
schemes have been proposed in sensor networks. According
to the network structure, the schemes can be divided into
centralized key distribution schemes [5] and distributed key
distribution schemes [6], [7]. According to the probability of
key sharing between a pair of sensor nodes, the key distribution
schemes can be classified into deterministic approaches [8], [9]

and probabilistic approaches [6], [7]. An investigation of key
distribution schemes for WSNs can be found in [1].
In this paper, we propose a security framework, uKeying,
for wireless sensor networks. uKeying does not depend on a
specific key distribution scheme as long as the key distribution
scheme provides pairwise keys for sensor nodes which must
exchange data. The establishment of the pairwise keys among
sensor nodes is one of the main tasks for a key distribution
scheme and has been extensively studied in the literature.
For example, the key distribution scheme in [6] consists of
three phases: key pre-distribution, shared-key discovery, and
path key establishment. In the key pre-distribution phase,
each sensor is equipped with a key ring held in the memory.
The key ring consists of k keys which are randomly drawn
from a large pool of P keys. In the shared key discovery
phase, each sensor discovers its neighbors within its wireless
communication range with which it shares keys. Finally, in the
path-key establishment phase, a path-key is assigned between
sensor nodes which are within wireless communication range
but do not share a key at the end of the second phase.
Key revocation refers to the task of securely removing keys
which are known to be compromised. To detect a compromised
sensor, intrusion detection techniques are employed. Intrusion
detection is out of the scope of this paper. We assume that there
are some methods [10], [11], [12] which can be used to detect
a compromised sensor node. Recent work conducted on key
revocation for WSNs include [6], [13], [14], [15], [16]. These
key revocation schemes can be divided into two categories:
the centralized key revocation schemes, such as EsRev scheme
[6], GPSRRev scheme [16], and the distributed key revocation
schemes, DistRev scheme [13], [14].
Although a few schemes [6], [14] have been proposed to
address the key revocation problem in WSNs, these schemes
encounter various difficulties when used in sensor networks.
For example, the EsRev scheme proposed in [6] requires a
signature key to be distributed to the non-revoked sensor
nodes. However, the signature key can only be distributed
by unicasting which causes severe performance issues in
large scale sensor networks. In GPSRRev scheme [16], the
revocation area is divided into sub-areas. For each sub-area, a
revocation message is sent to a certain node within that area
using GPSR protocol [17], and then the revocation message
is multicasted to the remaining sub-area. However, additional
information, such as location of the sensor nodes, must be
used. Further, the multicast of the revocation message in the
sub-area is implemented using message flooding and it is still
time and energy consuming. The distributed key revocation
scheme, DistRev, proposed in [14] is based on some simple
assumptions such as each node knowing its neighboring nodes
before the sensor network is deployed.
In [15], we proposed a centralized key revocation scheme,
KeyRev, for wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we utilize
the KeyRev scheme to provide revocation capability for the
framework and we further analyze, evaluate and compare the
performance of the KeyRev scheme with that of the three other
key revocation schemes.

Secure group communication is an important application in
wireless sensor networks [2]. The obvious benefit of secure
group communication to WSNs is that outside nodes are
unable to obtain any messages transmitted to the group.
Secure group communication is also attractive for in-network
processing and data aggregation [18]. In [2], we proposed
two SGC schemes (SGC-unicasting and SGC-broadcasting)
for wireless sensor networks based on using any sensor node
member as a group controller. In this paper, we further present
two new secure group communication schemes for WSNs (the
SGC-overlapping and the SGC-preloading schemes) using the
proposed key management framework.
III.

U K EYING : A

S ECURITY F RAMEWORK FOR WSN S

In this section, we propose our security framework, uKeying, for wireless sensor networks. This framework includes
three components, namely, a security mechanism to provide
secrecy, an efficient session key distribution scheme, and a
centralized key revocation scheme. We further demonstrate
how to use the framework to support an important applications
in WSNs, secure group communication.
A. A security mechanism to provide secrecy
The lifetime of a WSN is partitioned into time intervals
called sessions. The duration of sessions can be fixed or
dynamic depending on the applications. The base station is responsible for distributing session keys to the sensor nodes. We
use Kj to denote the j-th session key where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}
and m is the number of sessions. We assume that each sensor
is uniquely identified by an ID number i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and n is the largest ID number.
We use two kinds of keys for secure communication in the
sensor network: the encryption key, Kencr and the message
authentication code (MAC) key, Kmac . For any message
transmitted in the network, authentication, confidentiality, and
integration are required. Let A and B be two entities in a
WSN, the complete message A sends to B is:
A −→ B : E(Kencr , M ||Ts ), M AC(Kmac , {M ||Ts }Kencr )
where M is the message, Ts is the timestamp when sending
the message, E(K, R) denotes the encryption of the message
R with key K, and M AC(K, R) denotes the computation of
the message authentication code of message R with key K.
Let Kj be the current session key and KA,B represent the
pairwise key shared between the entity A and the entity B.
The encryption key and the MAC key used in session j can
be generated as follows:
Kencr = F (M AC(KA,B , Kj ), 1)
Kmac = F (M AC(KA,B , Kj ), 2)
where F (K, x) is a pseudo-random function and x is an
integer 1 or 2 for generating Kencr or Kmac respectively.
The security of the communication between A and B is
ensured by the encryption key, Kencr and the MAC key, Kmac .
Any message that A sends to B is encrypted by the encryption

key Kencr and signed by the MAC key Kmac . For any message that B receives from A, B always verifies the message
first and then decrypts it. Further, a sensor node always uses
the encryption key and the MAC key corresponding to the
current session key to encrypt and sign the outgoing messages
or decrypt and verify the incoming messages.
The pairwise key between A and B does not depend on a
specific key distribution scheme and thus, the framework can
be extended for implementation with other key distribution
schemes. Next, we introduce our session key distribution
scheme.
B. Session key distribution scheme
The session key distribution is based on the personal key
share distribution scheme in [19]. It can be divided into three
phases, viz., setup, broadcast, and session key recovery.
1) Setup: The setup server randomly picks m 2t-degree
masking polynomials, hj (x) = hj,0 + hj,1 x + · · · +
hj,2t x2t , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}, over a finite field Fq where
q is a sufficiently large prime number. For each sensor
node Ai , the setup server loads the personal secrets,
{h1 (i), h2 (i), · · · , hm (i)}, on to the node A. The setup
server also loads the polynomial, hj (x), on to the base
station. For each session key Kj , the setup server randomly picks a t-degree polynomial pj (x) and constructs
qj (x) = Kj − pj (x).
2) Broadcast: Given a set of revoked sensor nodes, R =
{r1 , r2 , · · · , rw }, w ≤ t in session j, the base station
distributes the shares of t-degree polynomial pj (x) and
qj (x) to non-revoked sensors via the following broadcast
message:
B

= {R}
∪ {Pj (x) = gj (x)pj (x) + hj (x)}
∪ {Qj (x) = gj (x)qj (x) + hj (x)}

(1)

where the revocation polynomial gj (x) is constructed
as gj (x) = (x − r1 )(x − r2 ) · · · (x − rw ). The authenticity of the broadcast message is ensured by broadcast
authentication schemes such as µT esla [20].
3) Session key recovery: If any non-revoked sensor node
Ai receives such a broadcast message, it evaluates the
polynomial Pj (x) and Qj (x) at point i and gets Pj (i) =
gj (i)pj (i) + hj (i) and Qj (i) = gj (i)qj (i) + hj (i).
Because Ai knows hj (i) and gj (i) 6= 0, it can compute
P (i)−h (i)
Q (i)−h (i)
pj (i) = j gj (i)j and qj (i) = j gj (i)j . Ai can then
compute the new session key Kj = pj (i) + qj (i). The
revoked sensors cannot recover pj (i) and qj (i) because
gj (i) = 0 and thus they cannot compute the new session
key.
Since the communication among sensor nodes depends on
their processing the correct session key, the sensor network
must be synchronized to use the same session key.
C. A centralized key revocation scheme
We proposed an efficient key revocation scheme, KeyRev,
for wireless sensor networks and evaluated its performance

against other centralized key revocation schemes in [15].
The KeyRev scheme can also be integrated in the proposed
framework. We consider two situations here:
1) In case there are no compromised sensors in the network,
the base station selects a constant c, c ∈
/ {1, · · · , n}, and
adds c to the revocation list such as R = {c}. Then,
the base station broadcasts the message as shown in
Equation 1.
2) In case a set of sensor nodes {r1 , r2 , · · · , rw } are compromised, the base station sets R = {r1 , r2 , · · · , rw } and
broadcasts the message as shown in Equation 1.
Without obtaining the new session key, the compromised
sensor cannot derive the encryption key, Kencr and the MAC
key, Kmac and thus cannot decrypt new messages and authenticate itself to other sensor nodes in the network. The
compromised sensor nodes can thus be removed from the
network.
To demonstrate the session key distribution process and the
key revocation scheme, an example is given below. We consider three sensors with ID numbers 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
We assume sensor 2 is compromised in session 5 and will
be revoked in session 6. In the setup phase, the setup server
picks the masking polynomial h6 (x) = 1 + x8 for session 6
and each sensor receives a secret h6 (1) = 2, h6 (2) = 257, and
h6 (3) = 6562 respectively. Let K6 = 101, p6 (x) = 1 + x4
and thus we have q6 (x) = 100 − x4 and g6 (x) = x − 2. In
session 6, the base station broadcasts a message:
B

= {2}
∪ {P6 (x) = (x − 2)(1 + x4 ) + 1 + x8 }
∪ {Q6 (x) = (x − 2)(100 − x4 ) + 1 + x8 }

When sensor 1 receives the message, sensor 1 calculates:
P6 (1) = 0, Q6 (1) = −97 and thus p6 (1) = 2 and q6 (1) = 99.
Sensor 1 computes the session key K6 = p6 (1)+q6 (1) = 101;
Similarly, sensor 3 calculates: P6 (3) = 6644, Q6 (3) = 6581
and thus p6 (3) = 82 and q6 (3) = 19. Sensor 3 can also
compute the session key K6 = p6 (3)+q6 (3) = 101. However,
sensor 2 cannot calculate p6 (2) and q6 (2) because g6 (2) = 0
and thus sensor 2 cannot derive the new session key.
D. Secure group communication
The proposed framework can be easily extended to support secure group communication using the unique session
key. The group key KG can be generated using a function
M AC(K, M ) over two secrets, a group key share Ks , and a
session key Kj :
KG = M AC(Kj , Ks )

(2)

The session key distribution has been described in Section
III-A. The group formation and the group key share distribution process are described below:
1) Solicitation of interest: The base station broadcasts a
message soliciting expression of interest in event E to
the sensor network:
B −→ ∗ : gid||E

The authentication of the broadcast message is ensured
by broadcast authentication schemes such as µT esla
[20]. No one can impersonate a base station and broadcast an authenticated message.
2) Join: All the receivers observing the same event E send
a Join Request to the base station:
A −→ B : IDA ||gid||E, M AC(KA,B , IDA ||gid||E)
where KA,B is the pairwise key shared by the sensor
node A with the base station B.
3) Group key share distribution: Once the base station
authenticates the join request, the base station unicasts
the group key share Ks to the sensor A using the Secret
Share message:
B −→ A : {Ks }KA,B
along the routing paths set up during the transmission
of the Interest and the Join Request messages (Please
refer to [2] for the details).
With the group key share Ks and the current session key
Kj , each group member can calculate the shared group key
KG as described in Equation 2.
The proposed scheme, which is referred to as SGCoverlapping scheme, is much simpler when a sensor node
wants to leave the group. The leave operation can be reduced
to the session key update problem and can be completed using
one broadcast message.
Notice that the group formation phase in the SGCoverlapping scheme may take a long time due to the use of
unicasting to distribute the group key share. If we know the
group membership during the pre-distribution stage, we can
load a group key share on to the sensor nodes before the
sensor network is deployed. Thus, the group formation phase
can be simplified as the distribution of the session key only.
The new scheme, SGC-preloading, is thus a specific instance
of the SGC-overlapping scheme.
Note that the solution of preloading a single mission key
on to the sensor nodes in the group does not work. Once
a sensor node is compromised, the single mission key is
exposed and cannot ensure the security of the group communication. However, in the SGC-preloading scheme, although
an adversary may compromise the sensor node to steal the
group key share, the adversary cannot participate in the group
communication until it obtains the session key. By preloading
a group key share in sensor nodes before the sensor network
is deployed, the SGC-preloading scheme greatly reduces the
group formation time. It requires only one broadcast message
to set up the group and update the group key.
IV. S ECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we first discuss the security of the framework.
Then, we analyze the computation, the communication costs,
and the storage requirements of the framework.

A. Security analysis
The proposed framework satisfies the following properties.
Property 1 The session key distribution process is secure.
The session key is distributed using the personal key distribution scheme [19]. To restore the session key, it is required
that some personal secret be pre-distributed among the sensor
nodes. Outsiders cannot recover the session key without the
pre-distributed secret. Further, as we show in Section III-A, the
revoked sensors cannot recover the new session keys either.
Thus, the session key distribution process is secure.
Property 2 The KeyRev scheme is secure inspite of the nonremoval of the pre-distributed key materials at a compromised
sensor node.
Although, due to the non-removal of the pre-distributed key
materials, the compromised sensor may retain the pairwise
keys, the adversaries cannot figure out the encryption key,
Kencr and the MAC key, Kmac if the session key is updated.
In the worst case, an adversary might use a chosen plaintext
attack to crack the session key; however, the attack itself is
also time consuming. As long as the duration of sessions is
less than the session key cracking time, the proposed key
revocation scheme is secure.
B. Performance analysis
The performance of the framework depends mainly on the
session key distribution process. Thus, we focus on the session
key distribution scheme.
1) Computation cost: To restore the session key, each
sensor node must evaluate the polynomial Pj (x) and Qj (x) at
point i. The polynomial evaluation is fast and thus the session
key recovery is efficient in computation.
2) Communication cost: The session key can be updated
in one round using broadcasting. The maximum size of the
broadcast message in bits is decided by S:
S = (5t + 2) log q
Let B indicate the transmission rate of the base station, L be
the maximum range between the base station and the sensor
nodes. The session key distribution time can be calculated as:
ts =

S
L
+
B
3 ∗ 108

Compared with the transmission time, the propagation delay is
very small. Thus, we can approximately estimate the session
key distribution time as:
ts ≈

(5t + 2) log q
B

3) Storage requirement: To restore the session key, each
sensor node needs to be loaded with m personal secrets. Since
the encryption key and the message authentication code key
can be set up on-the-fly, the extra storage needed to implement
the KeyRev scheme is m log q.

C. Comparison
The proposed framework does not depend on a specific key
distribution scheme. In the remainder of this section, we compare the KeyRev scheme and the secure group communication
schemes with the existing schemes in the literature.
1) KeyRev: The KeyRev scheme is a centralized key
revocation scheme. It depends on an efficient session key
distribution scheme which can be implemented in one round
using a broadcast message. In contrast, in case a sensor node is
compromised, the EsRev scheme requires two rounds of communications: distributing a signature key to the non-revoked
sensors, followed by broadcasting a message containing a list
of revoked key identifiers. Since the signature key is distributed
to the network using unicasting, the EsRev scheme may cause
heavy traffic in large scale sensor networks. Note that since
there is no need for the unicasting and the session key can be
updated in one round using broadcasting, the KeyRev scheme
performs much better than the EsRev scheme.
Although the GPSRRev scheme performs better than the
EsRev scheme by dividing the revocation field into sub-areas
and using multiple revocation messages, the multicast of the
revocation message in the sub-area is still time and energy
consuming. The KeyRev scheme is more efficient than the
GPSRRev scheme since it uses broadcast instead of multicast.
The distributed key revocation scheme, DistRev, has been
regarded to be faster than the centralized key revocation
schemes due to the fact that it requires only broadcast messages of a few hops that reach the local destinations [14].
However, in case a sensor node is compromised and revoked
successfully from the network, the DistRev scheme requires
four rounds of communications as follows (from [14]):
1) Neighboring nodes exchange the masks to decrypt the
votes for the current revocation sessions at the connection time.
2) At least t sensor nodes cast their votes against the target
node (compromised node) in the current session.
3) The voting nodes also cast their votes against the target
node on the next session.
4) If a sensor node receives at least t revocation votes,
a hash value containing the compromised sensor node
information needs to be broadcasted through the entire
network.
Although the first three rounds of the communications are
local broadcast, the last one involves a broadcast through the
entire network. The broadcast message can either be flooded
from the sensor node which receives t revocation votes or be
forwarded to the base station and broadcasted to the network
by the base station. Either way, the KeyRev scheme is much
better than the DistRev scheme since it requires only one
broadcast and no local communication is required. Further, the
DistRev scheme is also built on some simplifying assumptions,
for example, each node knows its neighboring nodes before
deployment, which are hard to satisfy in many sensor network
applications.
Table I compares the four revocation schemes discussed

in the paper, where n is the number of sensor nodes in
the network, d is the number of sub-areas in the GPSRRev
scheme, and t is the number of votes which a sensor node
has to collect to revoke a compromised node in the DistRev
scheme. We consider the situation when a single node is
compromised and revoked successfully from the network.
TABLE I
C OMPARISON OF THE KEY

REVOCATION SCHEMES IN WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS .

Scheme

I
II

EsRev
GPSRRev
KeyRev
DistRev

Rnds

Unicast

Broadcast

2
1
1
4

n
d
0
0

1
0
1
1

Local
Broadcast
0
d
0
2∗t

Scalability
Low
Medium
Good
Good

Category I denotes centralized key revocation schemes and category
II denotes distributed key revocation schemes. The GPSRRev scheme
requires the location information of the compromised sensor nodes.

The comparison in Table I shows that the KeyRev scheme
is better than other schemes in reducing the communication
overhead caused by the revocation protocol. Notice that the
KeyRev scheme requires a session key to be distributed to
the network during each session. The duration of the session
time could be set and adjusted dynamically according to the
application to reduce the background traffic in the sensor
network.
2) Secure group communication: In [2], we propose two
secure group communication schemes, SGC-unicasting and
SGC-broadcasting for wireless sensor networks. In this paper,
we present two other secure group communication schemes,
SGC-overlapping and SGC-preloading for wireless sensor
networks.
In SGC-unicasting and SGC-broadcasting schemes, the
group controller is a sensor node. Thus, the sensor node
must be granted local broadcast capability to start a group.
However, the capability can be abused by an adversary to
start inside flooding attacks. Further, since the group controller
needs to broadcast a message to its neighboring nodes to
request expression of interest, the authenticity of the local
broadcast message must be ensured to avoid the impersonation
of the group controller. However, most of proposed broadcast
authentication scheme such as [21], [22] are used for authenticating broadcast messages from the base station and cannot be
used for local broadcast. Without an efficient local broadcast
authentication scheme, the sensor nodes must be trustworthy in
Scheme-unicasting and Scheme-broadcasting. In case a sensor
node in the group is compromised, the adversary can know the
group keys which it possesses. If the compromised sensor node
is the group controller, the compromised sensor node may start
revocation attacks to remove non-revoked sensor nodes from
the group.
In SGC-overlapping and SGC-preloading schemes, the base
station is the group controller to initialize and start the group.
Thus, it is not necessary to grant the local broadcast capability
to sensor nodes. The authenticity of the broadcast message
can be ensured by schemes such as [21], [22]. Since the base

station is trustworthy, no adversary can impersonate the base
station and start the revocation attack either. In case a sensor
node in the group is compromised, the adversary may steal
the group key and eavesdrop on the communication until the
compromised sensor node is removed from the network.
The communication overhead of the proposed schemes
is compared in Table II. Since the SGC-unicasting scheme
depends on a key tree to distribute the group key, the scheme
must maintain the integrity of the key tree when sensors join
or leave the group. With the SGC-broadcasting, the SGCoverlapping and the SGC-preloading schemes, the distribution
of the group key does not depend on the key tree. Thus, it is
more easier to handle the join and the leave operations.
V. S IMULATION E XPERIMENTS AND R ESULTS
We evaluated the performance of the KeyRev scheme and
the secure group communication schemes in SENSIM, a
component-based discrete-event simulator for sensor networks.
We consider two sensor network experimental settings: a
small-scale sensor network with 100 nodes uniformly dispersed in a field with dimensions 100m × 100m and a largescale sensor network with 1000 nodes uniformly dispersed in
a field with dimensions 2000m×2000m. In both the networks,
we set the base station at the center of the field and we assume
that all the sensor nodes are within reach of the base station.
A. KeyRev scheme
We compare the KeyRev scheme with the centralized key
revocation schemes, the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev
scheme, and the distributed key revocation scheme, the DistRev scheme. The evaluation metrics include the key revocation time tv and the average energy consumption ev per
node to revoke a compromised sensor in the network. The
key revocation time is the time duration from when the key
revocation protocol starts until all the uncompromised sensor
nodes receive the key revocation message.
Table III shows the key revocation time to revoke a compromised sensor node in the two networks. As the table shows, in
the 100-node sensor network, the key revocation times using
the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme are about 83
times and 1.6 times that of the KeyRev scheme. In the 1000node sensor network, the key revocation times using the EsRev
scheme and the GPSRRev scheme are 800 times and 6.5 times
that of the KeyRev scheme. The KeyRev scheme is much
better than the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme in
terms of the key revocation time.
Table IV shows the average energy consumption to revoke
a compromised sensor in the 100-node and 1000-node sensor
networks. As the table shows, in the 100-node sensor network,
the average energy consumption to revoke a single node using
the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev are about 71 times and
19 times that of the KeyRev scheme. In the 1000-node sensor
network, the average energy consumption to revoke a single
sensor using the EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme are
about 714 times and 29 times that of the KeyRev scheme. The

KeyRev scheme is much better than the EsRev scheme and the
GPSRRev scheme in terms of the average energy consumption.
In both the experimental settings, the KeyRev scheme
performs very well compared with the EsRev scheme and the
GPSRRev scheme. Further, Tables III and IV also show that
the key revocation time and the average energy consumption to
revoke a single sensor node by using the KeyRev scheme have
only a slight difference between the 100-node sensor network
and the 1000-node sensor network, which indicates that the
KeyRev scheme is scalable to large-scale sensor networks.
However, due to the long key revocation delay caused by the
EsRev scheme, the EsRev scheme is not scalable to large-scale
sensor networks. The performance of the GPSRRev scheme is
better than the EsRev scheme but not as good as that of the
KeyRev scheme.
TABLE III
K EY

Scheme
EsRev
GPSRRev
KeyRev

REVOCATION TIME .

100-node WSN
Time (seconds)
49.63
1.02
0.59

TABLE IV
AVERAGE ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER

1000-node WSN
Time (seconds)
496.06
4.04
0.62

NODE TO REVOKE A

COMPROMISED SENSOR .

Scheme
EsRev
GPSRRev
KeyRev

100-node WSN
Energy (joules)
0.71
0.19
0.01

1000-node WSN
Energy (joules)
7.14
0.29
0.01

To evaluate the performance of the KeyRev scheme, we also
compare the KeyRev scheme with the DistRev scheme. The
metrics we evaluate include the key revocation time and the
average energy consumption. Each revocation session in the
DistRev scheme consists of three states: pending, active, and
completed. The critical part of the three states which decides
the key revocation time is the active state. In the active state,
a sensor node casts a vote and the vote is broadcasted locally
among the neighboring nodes. Assume that the active state
lasts for ∆s time for each node and ∆c is the maximum
time that a message needs to completely propagate in a local
neighborhood broadcast. We have tv > ∆s and ∆s > 2∆c
since each sensor has to vote both in the current session and
in the next session. Therefore, the key revocation time tv of
the DistRev scheme is at least twice that of ∆c , thus tv > 2∆c .
Similarly, let e∆s be the energy consumption during the active
state and e∆c be the energy consumption consumed during the
∆c period of time, We have ev > e∆s , e∆s > te∆c (to revoke
a compromised sensor node, the sensor node must receive at
least t revocation votes) and thus, ev > te∆c .
The duration of ∆c is decided by a maximum count L
(max-hops), over which the vote can be broadcasted to ensure
complete dissemination in the neighborhood of a compromised
sensor node (four-six hops can cover this area with high
probability [6]). We test the ∆c in the 100-node and the 1000-

TABLE II
C OMPARISON .

Group formation
Group key update

message
unicast
broadcast
unicast
broadcast

SGC-unicasting
nums
size
2n
O(log q)
1
O(log q)
n
O(log q)
0
n/a

SGC-broadcasting
nums
size
2n
O(log q)
2
O(t log q)
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)

SGC-overlapping
nums
size
2n
O(log q)
2
O(t log q)
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)

SGC-preloading
nums
size
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)
0
n/a
1
O(t log q)

node sensor networks. The sensor node casting the vote is set
to the center of each testbed. Table V shows the number of
sensor nodes in the coverage area when the max-hops changes.
TABLE V
T HE NUMBER OF NODES IN
L (max-hops)
100-node WSN
1000-node WSN

1
100
15

2
n/a
44

THE COVERED AREA .

3
n/a
85

4
n/a
142

5
n/a
219

6
n/a
299

Note: All the sensor nodes in the 100-node sensor network
are in the cover area when the max-hops is set to 1.

In the 100-node sensor network, the simulation results show
that ∆c = 0.035 seconds and e∆c = 995 nano-joules. Thus,
we have tv > 0.070 and ev > 995t nano-joules. Compared
with the KeyRev scheme in the 100-node sensor network as
shown in Tables III and IV, the DistRev scheme might be
better than the KeyRev scheme but the performance of the
KeyRev scheme is also very good in the 100-node sensor
network.
Figure 1 shows the key revocation time of the DistRev
scheme in the 1000-node sensor network when the maxhops changes. Note that the column value is not the real key
revocation time tv of the DistRev scheme but the value of
the 2∆c . The actual key revocation time is tv > 2∆c . The
dotted horizontal line shows the key revocation time of the
KeyRev scheme in the 1000-node sensor network. From the
figure, we can draw the conclusion that the KeyRev scheme is
better than the DistRev scheme in terms of the key revocation
time since the max-hops is definitely greater than one in the
DistRev scheme to ensure full coverage of the neighboring
nodes of the target node (compromised node).
Figure 2 shows the average energy consumption per node
in the DistRev scheme in the 1000-node sensor network when
the max-hops changes. The column value is also not the real
average energy consumption ev of the DistRev scheme but the
value of 2e∆c (we set t to the minimum value 2, t = 2). The
actual average energy consumption is ev > te∆c . The dotted
horizontal line shows the average energy consumption of the
KeyRev scheme in the 1000-node sensor network. The figure
indicates that the KeyRev scheme is better than the DistRev
scheme even if we set the number of votes to revoke a sensor
node to the minimum value of two.
To ensure that the neighborhood of the target node (compromised node) is fully covered, the max-hops cannot be set too
small. Thus, our proposed scheme, KeyRev, is better than the
DistRev scheme. From Figures 1 and 2, we can estimate the
performance of the KeyRev scheme and the DistRev scheme.
For example, if the max-hops is set to five, the key revocation

Fig. 1. Key revocation time in the 1000-node sensor network. The column
value is not the real key revocation time tv of the DistRev scheme but the
value of the 2∆c .

Fig. 2. Average energy consumption per node to revoke a compromised
sensor in the 1000-node sensor network. The column value is also not the
real average energy consumption ev of the DistRev scheme but the value of
2e∆c .

time of the DistRev scheme is at least 10.1 times that of
the KeyRev scheme and the average energy consumption of
the DistRev scheme is at least 6.8 times that of the KeyRev
scheme.
Overall, the KeyRev scheme is much better than the previously proposed centralized key revocation schemes, such as the
EsRev scheme and the GPSRRev scheme. It is also superior
to the distributed key revocation scheme, the DistRev scheme.
B. Secure group communication schemes
We also evaluate the performance of the two SGC schemes
(SGC-overlapping and SGC-preloading) with the schemes
(SGC-unicasting and SGC-broadcasting) proposed in [2]. Due
to the page limitations of this paper, we briefly introduce our
simulation and results here. Please refer to [23] for the details.
We test the four schemes for different group sizes in a
wireless sensor networks. The group size is decided by a
maximum count (max-hops) along the routes in which the
interest message is forwarded and we assume that all sensor
nodes which hear the message become group members. We
use the same group of sensor nodes for all the four schemes
in each test scenario.
We evaluate the group formation time, the group key update
time for each of the four schemes. We also evaluate the average

group member energy consumptions and the average group
controller energy consumptions during the group formation
phase and the group key update phases. Our simulation results
indicate that, with respect to the group formation time and
the energy consumption at the group controller and the group
member sensor nodes, the SGC-unicasting scheme performs
slightly better than the other schemes in the group formation
phase; however, the SGC-broadcasting, the SGC-overlapping,
and the SGC-preloading schemes perform far better than the
SGC-unicasting scheme in the group key update phase. Our
simulation also shows that the energy is distributed more
evenly in the SGC-broadcasting and the SGC-overlapping
schemes in both the group formation and group update phases.
To summarize, if the group is set up on-the-fly, the SGCoverlapping scheme is a better solution for secure group communication in sensor networks. If the group membership can
be decided in the pre-distribution stage, the SGC-preloading
scheme is the best solution for secure group communication
in sensor networks.
Note that the performance of the SGC-unicasting scheme
represents that of a general category of secure group communication schemes using a key tree structure.
VI. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
In this paper, we propose a security framework, uKeying,
for wireless sensor networks utilizing a globally distributed
session key. uKeying does not depend on a specific key
distribution scheme and can be used to support many other
security applications. Our analysis shows that the framework
is secure, efficient, and extensible. The simulation and results
also reveal for the first time that a centralized key revocation
scheme can also attain a high efficiency.
uKeying depends on a globally distributed session key
in the network, which requires that the sensor network be
synchronized. Since most broadcast authentication schemes,
such as µT esla, require the synchronization of all sensor
nodes in the network, it is not a problem if such broadcast
authentication schemes are used. Our future work will extend
the framework to scenarios where the sensor network is not
synchronized. Further investigation will also be conducted to
include more secure applications in the framework.
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